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PROMISE TO DO WHAT A MAN IS
BOUND TO DO
By Wm. J. COYNE
It is a fundamental rule of contract law that a promise to do
what one is already legally bound to do is a form of unreal con-
sideration insufficient to support a contract.'
A minority rule, however, which apparently limits this doc-
trine should be of particular attention to Indiana lawyers.
Cases involving this question commonly arise when one
party to a contract finds his agreement is more onerous than he
thought it to be, and he refuses to perform unless an additional
compensation is paid him. The most common case is when a
building or construction contractor meets unforseen difficulties,
becomes financially involved, has labor troubles, encounters a
shortage of materials, or finds he has made an unsatisfactory
contract in general. The contractor refuses to perform unless
promised further consideration. This is often promised by the
other party in a subsequent agreement, and the question is wheth-
er the contractor has furnished any consideration to sustain the
new contract.
The overwhelming weight of authority both in England and
America is that the second contract is void, and the contractor
cannot recover the additional compensation.2
I Anson, p. 83, Williston, Contracts, Vol. Sec. 130, 13 C. J. 35L.
2 Stilck v. Meyrick, .2 Camp. 317.
Federal: Alaska Packers' Association v. Domerico, 117 Fed. 99, 54 C.
C. A. 485.
Alabama: Shriner v. Craft, (1910) 166 Ala. 146, 28 IRA (NX) 450, 139
ASR 19, 51 So. 884.
Arkansas: Feldman v. Fox, 112 Ark. 223; 164 SW 766.
California: Main Street Co. v. Los Angeles Co., 129 Cal. 301, 61 Pac. 937.
Colorado: Benford v. Yockey, 164 Pac. 725.
Dist. of Columbia: Littlepage vJNeale Publishing Co., 34 App. D. C. 257.
Georgia: Wilmingham Sash & Door Co. v. Drew, (1903) 117 Ga. 850, 45
S. E. 237.
Illinois: Goldsmith v. Gable, 140 III. 269, 29 NE 722, 15 LRA 294; Leaf-
green v. Yablonsky; (1913) 178 Ill. Ap. 19.
Iowa: Ayres v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co.. (1879), 52 Iowa 478 3 NW 522.
Kentucky: Howard v. McNeil,' 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1394, 78 SW- 142.
Maine: Wescott v. Mitchell, 95 Me. 377. 50 Atl. 21.
Mass.: Parrot v. Mexican C. Ry. Co., 207 Mass. 184. 93 NE 590, 34 LRA
( NX) 261 (limiting the contrary doctrine which is still the general law in
Macss. See cases contra).
Michigan: Endris v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 49 Mich. 279, 13 NW 590.
Minnesota: King v. Duluty, M. & N. Ry. Co., (1895), 61 Minn, 482, 63
NW 1105; (recognizing contrary rule in case of unforseen difficulties).
Morrison & Co. v. Shonczynski, 61 Minn. 482, 63 NW 1105.
Missouri: Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., (1890) 103 Mo. 578,
15 SW 844; Lindsly & Son v. Kansas City Viaduct & Terminal Co.. (1911),
(Footnote No. 2 continued on next page.)
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A few jurisdictions, however, have sustained the second con-
tract.3 The grounds on which it has been sustained vary. The
case of Munroe v. Perkins, (1830) 9 Pick (Mass.) 298, 20 Am. Dec.
475, is the leading case in America in favor of the minority rule.
In that case a contractor who had agreed to build a house refused
to perform because of inadequacy of consideration. The parties
agreed by parol that the contractor should have more if he com-
pleted the work. The Massachusetts court justified its decision
on the ground that the first contract was waived and that "the
plaintiff went on the faith of the new promise and fiinished the
work. This was a sufficient consideration." The reasoning
amounts to a discharge of the first contract by mutual agreement,
a waiver of its benefits by the offended party, and the drawing
up of an entirely new agreement in regard to the same subject
matter in which the consideration is changed on one side.
(Footnote No. 2 concluded.)
152 Mo. App. 221, 133 SW 389 (semble).
Nabraska: Esterly Harvesting Co. v. Pringle, 41 Nebr. 265, 59 Nw 804.
New Jersey: Natalizzio v. Valentino, 71 NJL 500, 59 Atl. 8.
New York: McGovern v. N. Y., 234 NY 377, 138 NE 26, 25 A- L. R. 1442;
Casterton v. McIntire, (1893) 3 Misc. 380, 23 N. Y. Supp. 301.
North Carolina: Festerman v. Parker, (1894) 32 IN. C. (10 Fred L.) 474.
Ohio: Snyder v. Schardt, (1917) 29 Ohio C. C. 714.
Oregon: Haskins v. Powder Land & Irrigation Co., (1918) 90 Oregon
217, 176 Pac. 125.
Pennsylvania: Moyer v. Kirby, (1869) 2 Pearson 64; Dockell v. Old
Forge, (1913) 240 Pa. 98, 87 Atl. 421.
So. Carolina: Nesbitt v. Louisville C. & C. R. Co., (1844) 29 S. C. L. (2
Speers) 697; Colcock v. Louisville, 0. & C. Ry. Co., (1845), 32 S, C. L. 329.
Tennessee: Hanks v. Barron Bros., (1895) 95 Tenn. 276, 32 SW 195.
Texas: Jones v Risky, (1895) 91 Tex. 1, 32 SW, 1027; Brown v. Mc-
Gregor. (1898) 45 SW 923.
Vermont: Morrison v. Heath, (1839), 11 Vt. 610 (semble); Creamery
Package Mfg. Co. v. Russell, (1911) 84 Vt. 80, 32 LRA (NS) 135, 78 Atl. 718.
West Virginia: Vance v. Elleson, 76 W. Va. 592, 85 SE 776.
Hawaii: Magoon v. Marks, 11 Ha aii, 764.
a U. S.: U. S. v. Cook. (1922) 257 US 523, 66 L. Ed. 350, 42 S. C. R: 200
(semble); U. S. Steel Co. v. Casey, (1920) 262 Fed. 889.
Connecticut: Sasso v. K. G. & G. Realty & Construction Co. (1923) 98
Conn. 571, 120 Atl. 158.
Illinois: Bishop v. Busse, (1873) 69 Ill. 403; Cook v. Murphy, (1873) 70
Ill. 96.
Indiana: Coyner v. Lynde, (1858) 10 Indiana 282.
Kentucky: King Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., (1908) 131 Ky. 46, 114
SW 308.
Maryland: Linz v. Schuck, (1907) 106 Md. 220, 11 LRA (NS) 789, 124
ASR 481, 67 Atl. 286, 14 Am. Cas. 495.
Mass.: Munroe v. Perkins, (1830) 9 Pick. 298, 20 Am. Dec. 475.
Michigan: Scanlon v. Northwood, (1907) 147 Mich. 139, 110 NW 493.
New Jersey: Osborne v. O'Reilly, (1887) 42 N. J. Eq. 467, 9 Atl. 209.
New York: Meech v. Buffalo, (1864) 29 N. Y. 198; Reisler v. Silbermintz,
(1904) 99 App. Div. 131, 90 N. Y. Supp. 967.
Minnesota: King v. Duluth Ry. Co., 61 Minn. 482, 63 NW 1105.
INo. Dakota: Goar v. Green, 6 N. Dak. 48, 68 NW 318.
Texas: Galveston v. Galveston City R. Co., (1877) 46 Tex. 435.
Washington: Evans v. Oregon & W. Ry. Co., (1910) 58 Wash. 429, 2Z,
LRA (NS) 455, 108 Pac. 1095; McGillvrae v. Bremerto, (1916) 90 Wash. 394,
156 Pgc. 23.
Wisconsin: Grant Marble Co. v. Abbot, (1910) 142 Wisc. 279, 124 NW264.
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The other ground commonly given for sustaining such a
second contract is that the offending party had a right to subject
himself to liability in damages rather than performing his obliga-
tion. The subsequent promise to perform, and, thus, the sur-
render of his right to pay damages has been upheld as sufficient
"legal detriment" to constitute consideration for the second con-
tract.
The case of Coyner v. Lynde, (1858), 10 Indiana 282, appar-
ently relies upon both of these arguments. It cites Munroe v.
Perkins, as a precedent for its decision and expressly states the
argument of the surrender to pay damages. In this case the de-
fendant discovered that the pric.e at which he had agreed to con-
struct a road bed for the plaintiff was grossly inadequate and he
determined to abandon his contract. The plaintiff promised the
defendant that if he would continue the work, the plaintiff would
release to him the commission he had been promised for giving
the contract to the defendant (who was a subcontractor). The
court held that "it was a question for the jury whether the old
contract had been abandoned", and the jury found that it had
been.. If the old contract had been abandoned, then the new one
was valid for the reasons, supra.:
Prof. Knowlton in his annotations to Anson on Contracts4
distinguishes such cases as Coyner v. Lynde from the general rule
on the ground that they represent a form of substituted agree-
ments which discharges the first contract. He says these
cases "at first sight seem to be in conflict" with those represent-
ing the general rule. Professor Williston,5 however, recognizes
this line of cases as contrary to the general rule. It is virtually
impossible to reconcile Munroe v. Perkins and Coyner v. Lynde
with those cases cited in accord with the well known rule that a
promise to do what one is already legally bound to do is not a
real consideration.
The case of Coyner v. Lynde apparently has never been over-
ruled. Several Indiana cases following Reynolds v. Nugent, 25
Indiana 328, recognize the general rule in regard to considera-
tion, but all of them can be distinguished from Coyner v. Lynde
on the fact that in them the first contract was not held to have
4 Anson, "Contracts", Knowlton's Edition, page 107.
5 Williston, "Contracts", Volume 1, page 276.
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been abandoned. Indiana is at present apparently committed to
this minority doctrine.
The editor of American Law Reports in 25 ALR 1451 says:
"Whatever view may be taken in general regarding the validity
of a promise to pay a building contractor additional compensation
if he will complete the contract, the courts ordinarily, as will be
seen from the cases, have sustained the subsequent promise if it
rests upon some equitable ground, such as mistake or unanticip-
ated difficulties". The editor's statement seems to be the strong-
est to be found in support of the minority view. None of those
states which have hitherto adhered to the strict general rule have
been converted by the rasoning of the minority, even in the case
of unantic.ipated difficulties. "True, a rather recent decision, that
of Sasso v. K. G. & G. Realty and Construction Co., (1923), 98.
Conn. 570, 120 Atl. 158, adheres to the minority view with the
same reasoning as that of Coyner v. Lynde, that the original con-
tract was abandoned and a new one substituted in its place. But
Connecticut was already committed to the minority doctrine in
Connelly v. Devoe, 37 Conn. 576.
On the other hand, Massachusetts, the founder of the minor-
ity rule, has limited it somewhat in Parrot v. Mexican Central R.
R. Co., 207 Mass. 184, 93 NE 59, 34 LRA (NS) 261, saying: "the
doctrine should not be extended beyond the cases to which it is
applicable upon the recognized reasons that have been given for
it".
The minority rule is without question unsound. Professor
Williston attacks the reasoning in support of it in his work on
Contracts, Volume 1, page 277. He attacks the first theory, that
a promisor has an option, to perform or pay damages by saying
(in effect) that by paying damages the contractor does not per-
form his legal duty and consequently suffers no 'legal detriment'.
Moreover, even if the surrender of the contractor's right to pay
damages were a sufficient 'legal detriment', to constitute a con-
sideration, then the second contract would still give the con-
tractor the option to perform or to pay practically the same dam-
ages as he would have paid under the first contract. The refined
'legal detriment', therefore, runs around in a vicious circle. Wil-
lison attacks the second justification of the minority rule, that
6 Willston, Contracts, Vol. 1, Page 279.
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the first contract has been rescinded Dy mutual agreement, by
saying that "the agreement for recission does not do away with
the necessity for consideration". It can scarcely be said that
"promissory estoppel is a substitute for consideration either in
creating or discharging obligations."
7
7 Wi]liston, Contracts, Vol. 2, page 1336.
